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Executive Summary 
 
Since 1999, Georgia’s PeachCare for Kids™ Program has expanded health insurance coverage 
for Georgia’s low-income children, those at risk of being otherwise uninsured.  A common 
finding in the academic literature on CHIP premiums is that increases in premiums reduce the 
duration of CHIP enrollment.  Over the past several years Georgia has implemented significant 
increases in the premium levels charged to families participating in its PeachCare program.  In 
response to a request from the Department of Community Health, researchers associated with the 
Georgia Health Policy Center (GHPC) have completed an analysis of the effect of the level of 
CHIP premiums on the duration of children’s spans of CHIP enrollment and examined whether 
or not this relationship varies by child health status.   
 
Given policy changes in Georgia, there is significant variation in premiums among PeachCare 
enrollees over time, by family size, and across incremental levels of income when measured as a 
percentage of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL).  We exploit this policy-induced variation in 
premiums to create an ―effective premium‖ for each family and estimate the duration of 
enrollment for each child in that family as a function of the effective premium, controlling for 
measureable characteristics of each child and their family.  We define the ―effective premium‖ as 
the amount a family has to pay per child per month given the PeachCare premium structure and 
the number of children in the family that are enrolled in a premium paying category of 
PeachCare.  
 
We use data obtained from the PeachCare for Kids™ eligibility system and claims database from 
January 2003 to May 2006 for this study.  These data reflect: i) the information submitted by 
families at the time of their application for PeachCare regarding the child/children for whom 
coverage is sought and the family of the applicant, ii) enrollment information contained in the 
Medicaid/PeachCare enrollment database for all enrollees, and iii) health care consumption 
information contained in the Medicaid/PeachCare claims database for all enrollees.  One key 
characteristic of the application data is the ability to reconstruct family income used to determine 
eligibility and hence, applicable effective premiums over time.   
 
The data provided to the GHPC cover almost 600,000 spans of coverage for children enrolled at 
any time during the study period.  We focus on spans for children who could face a premium at 
some point during the study period with no missing or unusual values for our key analysis 
variables.  Our analysis sample consists of 315,415 enrollment spans.  These 315,415 spans 
represent a total of over 2.5 million months of coverage generated by 200,412 unique children in 
130,633 families.     
 
We find that a single dollar increase in the effective (per child) premium is associated with an 
increase in a typical child's monthly probability of exiting PeachCare from 7.70 percent to 7.83 
percent.  We also find that children considered to be in poor health because they have a chronic 
health condition (asthma, diabetes, or a mental health condition) are less likely to exit PeachCare 
than healthy children.  Finally, we use these estimates to predict the impact of a $5, $10, or $15 
increase in PeachCare premiums.  We find that an additional three percent of enrollees are 
expected to exit during a 12 month period if premiums are increased by $5.  This increases to 
seven percent for a $10 premium increase and ten percent for a $15 premium increase.    
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Introduction 
 
Since its introduction in 1999, Georgia’s PeachCare for Kids™ Program has expanded health 
insurance coverage for Georgia’s low-income children, those at risk of being otherwise 
uninsured.  At any given time, between 8 and 10 percent of Georgia’s children are enrolled in the 
PeachCare program.  This program has been an important factor in keeping coverage rates for 
children significantly higher than rates for adults within our state.  It is important to understand 
the characteristics of Georgia’s program that may contribute to stability of coverage.  Nationally, 
empirical evidence suggests that state program characteristics are partially determinative of the 
relative success of Children’s Health Insurance Programs (CHIP) in reducing the number of 
uninsured children within each state (Wolfe and Scrivner, 2005; Sommers, 2005; Marton, 2007).  
A key program characteristic is the choice of whether to and at what level to impose CHIP 
premiums. 
 
A common finding in the literature on CHIP premiums is that increases in premiums reduce the 
duration of CHIP enrollment (Boylston-Herdon, Vogel, et.al, 2008; Marton, 2007; Shenkman, 
Vogel, et.al., 2002; Marton, Ketsche, Zhou, 2010).  Over the past several years Georgia has 
implemented significant increases in the premium levels charged to families participating in its 
PeachCare program.  In response to a request from the Department of Community Health 
(DCH), researchers associated with the Georgia Health Policy Center (GHPC) have completed 
an analysis of the effect of the level of CHIP premiums on the duration of children’s spans of 
CHIP enrollment and examined whether or not this relationship varies by child health status.  
This study provides a unique insight into the effect of premium increases because we are able to 
measure families’ responsiveness to a wide variation in premium changes rather than rely on 
only the observation of a time-dependent implementation of a new premium or change in a 
premium equally applicable to all families.  Thus, the effect we estimate is the ―per dollar‖ effect 
of a premium increase.  We use these findings to simulate enrollment changes if premiums are 
increased for the same cohort of children by $5 or $10 per member, per month.  We are able to 
link enrollment and claims data in order to control for child health status.   
 
Background 
 
Literature 
As of January 2008, over 30 states charged premiums for some or all of the children enrolled in 
their CHIP programs.  Policymakers frequently alter premiums by either changing the income 
thresholds for the categories of children subject to premiums or by raising or lowering the level 
of premiums required within these eligibility categories.  For example, according to Cohen-Ross, 
Horn, and Marks (2008), between 2006 and 2008, 10 states implemented new premium 
requirements for children with incomes just above the federal poverty level (FPL), seven states 
either imposed new or increased existing premiums, and five states either lowered or eliminated 
premiums.  Among states with CHIP premiums, effective monthly premiums for two children in 
the lowest income eligibility class ranged from $8 to $30, while monthly premiums for two 
children in families with incomes above 200 percent of the FPL were in excess of $200 (KFF 
2008).  The wide variation in premiums both within and across states and the frequency with 
which premiums are changed suggest a need to better understand both the short run and long run 
effects on enrollment duration. 
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Numerous studies have shown that CHIP premiums have a measurable impact on enrollment.  
For example, Shenkman et al. (2002) demonstrate that even small CHIP premium reductions 
reduce disenrollment, albeit only slightly, and increase the likelihood that a previously 
disenrolled child will be reenrolled.   Boylston-Herndon et al. (2008) find that increasing 
premiums in Florida reduces the duration of enrollment spans and that the effect is stronger for 
lower income (<150 percent FPL) enrollees; children with chronic health conditions are less 
sensitive to these premium changes.  Notably, even after the premium increase in Florida was 
rescinded, enrollment spans for the lowest income SCHIP children (<150 percent FPL) did not 
return to prior lengths, suggesting that premium changes can result in an effect that goes beyond 
the simple price effect on short-run consumer behavior.   Marton (2007) studies the effect of the 
imposition of a new CHIP premium in Kentucky and finds that the duration of enrollment spans 
is significantly reduced by the new premium.  During the first three months after the introduction 
of a new premium, disenrollment was more than double the baseline rate for children in the 
premium paying category.  Marton and Talbert (2010) also examine CHIP data in Kentucky and 
show that children with chronic health conditions are less likely to exit than healthy children. 
  
With respect to Georgia’s PeachCare for Kids™ program, Ketsche et al (2007a) study the effect 
of the transition from non-premium to premium eligibility on the enrollment of six-year-olds in 
PeachCare.  The authors find that most of the children enrolled in Medicaid at their 6
th
 birthday 
who are expected to transition to PeachCare and begin paying premiums either recertify 
eligibility for Medicaid or disenroll from public coverage altogether.  In addition, the authors 
find that in conjunction with disenrollment, when faced with the premium, there appear to be a 
significant number of six-year-olds who move from PeachCare for Kids™ to Medicaid.  Marton, 
Ketsche, and Zhou (2010) compare the response to the imposition of a new premium in 
Kentucky with increases in an existing premium in Georgia; the authors find a larger response to 
a newly imposed rather than an increased premium, even when the magnitude of the premium 
change is substantial.     
 
In most states, CHIP premiums do not vary or vary only slightly among enrollees. Therefore, 
most studies use the imposition of a new, or a change in an existing premium at a point in time to 
estimate enrollee response to a premium.  In contrast, given recent policy changes in Georgia, 
there is significant variation in premiums among PeachCare enrollees over time, by family size, 
and across incremental levels of income when measured as a percentage of the FPL.  We exploit 
this policy-induced variation in premiums to create an ―effective premium‖ for each family and 
estimate the duration of enrollment for each child in that family as a function of the effective 
premium, controlling for measureable characteristics of each child and their family.  We define 
the ―effective premium‖ as the amount a family has to pay per child per month given the 
PeachCare premium structure and the number of children in the family that are enrolled in a 
premium paying category of PeachCare. This study builds upon the report the GHPC submitted 
to DCH last year by controlling for child health status and contrasting PeachCare exits to 
Medicaid with PeachCare exits to no public health insurance coverage. 
 
PeachCare Premium Policy  
Since the inception of the program, premiums for PeachCare have been in place for children over 
the age of six.  Prior to July 2003, premiums of $7.50 for one and $15 for two or more children 
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in the same family applied to all enrollees.  In July of 2003, the premium for one child at all 
income levels was increased from $7.50 to $10.  In addition, family premiums were scaled by 
two income levels such that a premium of $15 applied for two or more children for families 
below 150 percent of FPL but a premium of $20 applied for two or more children for families 
with incomes above 150 percent of FPL.  This represented an increase of $5 for families in this 
higher income category of eligibility.  Premiums were increased more significantly for these 
higher income families in July of 2004 when premiums ranging from $20/$40 to $35/$70 based 
on a sliding scale were imposed.  Table 1 below summarizes these changes in premiums over 
time.  
 
Table 1: A History of Premiums for PeachCare Enrollees Age Six and Older 
 
  Before July 2003 July 2003-June 2004 After June 2004 
FPL One Child Family Cap One Child Family Cap One Child Family Cap 
100-150%        $7.50  $15  $10  $15  $10  $15  
151-160% $7.50  $15  $10  $20  $20  $40  
161-170% $7.50  $15  $10  $20  $22  $44  
171-180% $7.50  $15  $10  $20  $24  $48  
181-190% $7.50  $15  $10  $20  $26  $52  
191-200% $7.50  $15  $10  $20  $28  $56  
201-210% $7.50  $15  $10  $20  $29  $58  
211-220% $7.50  $15  $10  $20  $31  $62  
221-230% $7.50  $15  $10  $20  $33  $66  
231-235% $7.50  $15  $10  $20  $35  $70  
 
For children in families with two or more children and incomes below 150 percent of FPL, there 
has been no change in premiums at all, while for children in families with two children and 
incomes at the upper bounds of eligibility, premiums have increased almost five fold in two 
years.   
 
This study exploits these policy changes and newly available data that provide actual premiums 
paid by each family for each child enrolled to estimate the effect of ―effective per-child 
premiums‖ on span duration, controlling for child health status. 
 
 Data  
 
We use data obtained from the PeachCare for Kids™ eligibility system and claims database from 
January 2003 to May 2006 for this study.  This time frame allows us to observe families and 
children enrolled during periods of time before and after the various premium levels shown in 
table 1.   These data reflect: i) the information submitted by families at the time of their 
application for PeachCare regarding the child/children for whom coverage is sought and the 
family of the applicant, ii) enrollment information contained in the Medicaid/PeachCare 
enrollment database for all enrollees, and iii) health care consumption information contained in 
the Medicaid/PeachCare claims database for all enrollees.  One key characteristic of the 
application data is the ability to reconstruct family income used to determine eligibility and 
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hence, applicable effective premiums over time.  In addition, both the application and enrollment 
data allow us to control for basic family demographic information for each child (age, sex, 
race/ethnicity, county of residence, age and sex of primary parent).  As mentioned above, the 
claims data will allow us to control for the health status of each child.  
 
The data provided to the GHPC cover almost 600,000 spans of coverage for children enrolled at 
any time during the study period.  We focus on spans for children [and families] who could face 
a premium at some point during the study period (starting at age three if enrollment continues to 
the 6
th
 birthday).  We exclude spans for children over the age of 18 or with missing or unusual 
values for key variables of interest: child race/ethnicity, child age, primary parent age, primary 
parent gender, family premium level, or family income.  We also exclude ―left-censored‖ spans.  
These are spans that were already underway as of January 2003.  If a child was not a new 
enrollee in January 2003, then we cannot determine how many previous months of coverage 
such a child had.  If we included such spans, we would have to, for example, treat children with 
two prior years of coverage the same as children with two prior months of coverage.  We 
dropped a significant number spans because the reported family income was below the poverty 
line.  Our understanding is in a prior information system, children referred to Right from the 
Start Medicaid (RSM) and then deemed to be over income eligibility levels for Medicaid were 
enrolled in PeachCare without correction of their income information.   
 
Table 2: Number of Spans and Children in Our Sample 
 
  Children Spans 
Total: 200,412 315,415 
Children with 1 span 133,679 133,679 
Children with 2 spans 39,367 78734 
Children with 3 spans 15,182 45546 
Children with 4 or more spans 12,184 57,456 
 
After dropping these spans, we are left with 315,415 enrollment spans in our sample.  These 
315,415 spans represent a total of over 2.5 million months of coverage generated by 200,412 
unique children in 130,633 families.  Within our sample, about 37 percent of the spans are ―right 
censored‖ in that the child is either still enrolled at the end of the study period or the child ages 
out of coverage. Therefore, we cannot observe when the child would have dropped coverage as a 
function of their effective per-child premium. 
 
We are interested in the extent to which the spans in our sample represent the spectrum of 
possible premiums within the PeachCare program.  Table 3 shows that about 37 percent of the 
spans are associated with incomes above 150 percent of FPL where exogenous premium changes 
are significant and affect all children, regardless of family size.  Children in families with no 
enrolled siblings in the 101-150 percent of FPL income eligibility category also experienced an 
exogenous premium increase during the study period.  Therefore, even among this large cohort 
of lower income enrollees, many experienced changes in the absolute premium during their span 
of coverage.     
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Table 3: Distribution of Spans by Initial Income Eligibility Category 
 
FPL Spans 
101-150% 62.53% 
151-160% 9.17% 
161-170% 7.26% 
171-180% 5.84% 
181-190% 4.67% 
191-200% 3.59% 
201-210% 2.98% 
211-220% 2.18% 
221-230% 1.36% 
231-235% 0.42% 
 
Sample Means and Tabular Analysis 
Table 4 provides sample means for the entire sample of spans in addition to separate sample 
means for spans generated by children before age seven and spans generated by children aged 
seven and over.  The purpose of this sample stratification is to test whether the effect of the 
premium is different in a sample of children where some move from a non-premium to a 
premium requirement [at age six] compared to the sample of children already in a premium 
paying eligibility category but experiencing an increase.  We can see that the average length of 
spans generated by younger children is significantly longer than those generated by older 
children, and that younger children are less likely to exit the program.  Average premiums are 
significantly lower for the younger children, because many start their spans with premiums at 
zero.  Of course, by defining the younger cohort to include children up to and including those 
starting their spans at age six, there are some spans in this younger cohort that start with positive 
premiums. All of these sample children face a premium at some point during the study.   
 
In order to assure ourselves that our sample includes children that actually experience a change 
in their effective premium we compare family premiums and per child effective premiums in the 
first and last month of each span.  We find that premiums and effective premiums are constant 
throughout the span for about 80 percent of the observed spans.  Among children experiencing a 
change, about 64 percent experienced an increase in effective premiums, while the remaining 
group of almost 36 percent experienced a decline in their effective premium.  This measure may 
understate the extent to which effective premiums vary, since it is possible for some children to 
have a premium change within a span even if the first and last month premiums are constant. 
 
Among spans in which the first and last month premiums are not the same, the mean premium 
increase is more than $9 per member, per month.  Among spans in which the first and last month 
effective premiums are not the same, the mean increase is over $5 per member, per month.    
Across all spans for all children, the effective premiums measured across all months are 48 
percent higher than effective premiums in the first month ($10.56 versus $7.15 in Table 4)
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for our PeachCare Sample of Spans  
 
Variable All children Under 7 7 or older 
Number of Children 200,412 46,722 153,690 
Number of Spans 315,415 51,276 264,139 
Number of Exits 198,198 25,040 173,158 
Avg. Span Length (months) 8.17 10.67 7.68 
Avg. Exit Probability 7.70% 4.58% 8.54% 
Other Span Characteristics       
Avg. Effective premium $ (first month)* 7.15 4.04 7.76 
Avg. Effective premium $ (all months)* 10.22 8.12 10.79 
Avg. Effective premium $ (last month)* 10.56 8.81 10.90 
Avg. Actual Payment (first month) 12.09 5.80 13.31 
Avg. Actual Payment (all months) 17.05 11.67 18.50 
Avg. Federal Poverty Level (FPL) 146.84 154.80 144.69 
% from Medicaid 15.48% 35.87% 11.52% 
Demographics       
Avg. Age (first month) 10.73 5.29 11.79 
% Female 49.26% 48.86% 49.34% 
% White 43.63% 46.35% 43.10% 
% Hispanic 7.91% 13.48% 6.83% 
% African American 41.28% 30.57% 43.36% 
% Other Race 7.18% 9.60% 6.71% 
% Citizen 99.18% 99.60% 99.10% 
% Born to Teen Mother 0.03% 0.17% 0.00% 
% Parent over 40 (first month) 28.53% 12.37% 31.66% 
% Mother Primary Parent 75.23% 72.60% 75.75% 
% Diabetes 0.29% 0.11% 0.32% 
% Asthma 7.96% 11.95% 7.19% 
% Mental Health Diagnosis 14.66% 12.03% 15.17% 
% High CDPS Score 28.12% 24.98% 28.73% 
    Note: Effective premiums are adjusted for family size based on the number of children in the 
family in the premium paying PeachCare eligibility category. 
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Analytic Methods 
 
We empirically model the duration of a child’s enrollment in PeachCare for Kids™ as a function 
of the premium and family income, allowing those characteristics to vary over time.  We assume 
that in each month families compare the expected utility net of any monetary (i.e. premiums) or 
non-pecuniary costs (i.e. stigma) of remaining in PeachCare with the net expected utility 
associated with exiting.  Our formal proportional hazards model can be stated as follows: 
 
H(t) = exp(X1t’β1)* exp(tα1 + t
2
α2) (1) 
 
As in Marton, Ketsche, and Zhou (2010) we are estimating the impact of the observable 
characteristics parametrically using the standard proportional hazards functional form 
(exp(X1t’β1)).  Rather than modeling the baseline hazard in the standard way (Weibull 
distribution), we include a quadratic in time on the right hand side of our model (exp(tαj1 + 
t
2
αj2)).  While our approach to modeling the baseline hazard is still a parametric one, it does 
provide more flexibility than the Weibull distribution.  In addition, we include as controls on the 
right hand side of our model indicators for spikes in the underlying hazard.  These spikes occur 
in the first three months of enrollment, December of each year and in July 2005.      
 
As mentioned above, we construct an ―effective premium‖ as our key independent variable of 
interest.  The effective premium is the premium from the schedule shown in Table 1 divided by 
the number of children in a family enrolled in a premium paying category of PeachCare for a 
given month.  We control for observable demographic characteristics measured on the date of 
enrollment that do not vary with time (child age, gender, race/ethnicity, and citizenship status, 
primary parent age and gender, and the child’s public health district of residence).  We also 
include an indicator for whether or not this span was initiated as a result of a transfer from 
Medicaid. 
 
By linking the enrollment and application data to the claims database, we are able to create 
several indicators for the existence of chronic health conditions among children in the sample.  
The chronic conditions we analyzed are asthma, diabetes, and a variety of mental health 
conditions, including: mental retardation, schizophrenia, depression, and attention deficit 
disorder.  We follow Shenkman et al. (2002) and Marton and Talbert (2010) and assign a chronic 
condition to a child if an ICD-9 code associated with the particular condition appears two or 
more times in their records.  The ICD-9 code associated with diabetes is 250, the code associated 
with asthma is 493, and the codes associated with the set of mental health conditions are 290-
319.  Table 4 shows that less than one percent of the spans in our sample are generated by a 
diabetic child, nearly eight percent are generated by an asthmatic child, and 15 percent are 
generated by a child with a mental health condition.  Finally, we also include an indicator if the 
child’s CDPS score is above average for this sample.  The CDPS is a risk of death score assigned 
to a child based on their diagnosis and NDC codes. 
 
We estimate the model separately for children less than age seven and age seven or older in order 
to isolate the effect of turning six from the more general effect of the premium on duration of 
enrollment.  For children starting their span under age six we include both a dummy for the 
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month in which they turn six and a control for the magnitude of the premium in that month.  
 
Results 
 
For each set of hazard regression results Table 5 gives the hazard coefficient for each variable, 
the standard error, the p-value associated with the hypothesis test that the hazard is equal to one 
(i.e. the variable in question has no impact on the duration of enrollment), and the absolute value 
associated with each variable.  Hazard ratios are relative probabilities, which is why we also 
report the absolute values.  For example, the hazard ratio associated with the African-American 
indicator in the full sample regression says that African-American children are 29 percent more 
likely to exit in a given month than white children.  In order to know whether or not this is a big 
effect, we need a reference.  We use as a reference the average monthly exit probability for the 
entire sample, 7.70 percent.  This is what the absolute effect captures.  For African-American 
children, the absolute effect says that the monthly probability of an exit is 9.96 percent.  This can 
be compared directly with the average monthly exit probability of 7.70 percent.   
 
Our key variable of interest is the effective premium associated with each child’s coverage.  
Since the premium is in dollar increments, the coefficient on the effective premium variable 
represents the incremental increase in the probability of disenrolling associated with a one dollar 
change in the effective premium.  For all children together, a single dollar increase in the 
effective (per child) premium is associated with an increase in their probability of exiting from 
7.70 percent to 7.83 percent each month.  For younger children, the average exit probability is 
lower than for the older cohort (4.58 versus 8.54 percent—see Table 4), but the effect of a dollar 
increase in premiums on their exit rate is slightly greater as it increases with each dollar from 
4.58 to 4.72 percent versus an increase of 8.54 to 8.65 percent for the older children. Simulation 
results presented in Table 6 also help with the interpretation of these findings. 
 
With respect to our other covariates, we note that the probability that a child will exit from 
PeachCare during the month he or she turns six is very high, consistent with prior findings with 
respect to this group (Ketsche et al, 2007a).  A very small number of qualified non-citizens are 
enrolled in PeachCare and being a citizen increases the probability of exiting significantly 
compared to non-citizen children.  The probability of exiting also varies by race/ethnicity as it is 
lower than average for Hispanic children and higher than average for African-American children.  
The probability of exiting increases in families with a mother as the primary parent and 
decreases in families with older parents.  Children beginning a PeachCare span by transferring 
from Medicaid coverage in the previous month are less likely to exit PeachCare than children 
who had no public health insurance coverage in the previous month.  The FPL indicators should 
be compared to the 101-150 percent of FPL eligibility category.  Their coefficients suggest that 
as family income increases, children are less likely to exit PeachCare, everything else (including 
effective premium levels) being equal.   
  
One unique feature of this analysis is that we are controlling for child health status.  Children 
considered to be in poor health because they have a chronic health condition (asthma, diabetes, 
or a mental health condition) are less likely to exit PeachCare than children without chronic 
health conditions.  In addition, children with an above average CDPS score are less likely to exit 
PeachCare coverage.  These findings are similar to findings with respect to child health status 
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and the duration of CHIP coverage in Florida (Shenkman et al, 2002) and Kentucky (Marton and 
Talbert, 2010). 
Table 5: Hazard Model Results 
 
    
All 
Kids       
Under 
7       
7 or 
Older     
Variable Hazard S.E. 
P-
value 
Abs. 
Value Hazard S.E. 
P-
value 
Abs. 
Value Hazard S.E. 
P-
value 
Abs. 
Value 
Effective Premium 1.018 0.000 0.000 7.83% 1.031 0.001 0.000 4.72% 1.013 0.000 0.000 8.65% 
Premium Age 6 0.930 0.003 0.000 7.15% 0.918 0.003 0.000 4.20% N/A 
  
  
FPL_151_160 0.883 0.007 0.000 6.79% 0.686 0.015 0.000 3.14% 0.943 0.009 0.000 8.05% 
FPL_161_170 0.867 0.008 0.000 6.68% 0.672 0.016 0.000 3.08% 0.930 0.009 0.000 7.94% 
FPL_171_180 0.850 0.009 0.000 6.54% 0.654 0.017 0.000 2.99% 0.916 0.010 0.000 7.82% 
FPL_181_190 0.792 0.009 0.000 6.10% 0.638 0.019 0.000 2.92% 0.851 0.011 0.000 7.26% 
FPL_191_200 0.755 0.010 0.000 5.81% 0.574 0.019 0.000 2.63% 0.822 0.012 0.000 7.02% 
FPL_201_210 0.752 0.011 0.000 5.78% 0.622 0.022 0.000 2.85% 0.808 0.013 0.000 6.90% 
FPL_211_220 0.743 0.012 0.000 5.72% 0.593 0.024 0.000 2.71% 0.809 0.015 0.000 6.91% 
FPL_221_230 0.751 0.016 0.000 5.78% 0.592 0.032 0.000 2.71% 0.822 0.019 0.000 7.02% 
FPL_231_235 0.684 0.032 0.000 5.27% 0.585 0.068 0.000 2.68% 0.739 0.038 0.000 6.31% 
From Medicaid 0.869 0.006 0.000 6.69% 0.963 0.013 0.005 4.41% 0.831 0.007 0.000 7.10% 
Female 1.002 0.005 0.588 7.71% 1.013 0.013 0.304 4.64% 1.001 0.005 0.778 8.55% 
Hispanic 0.781 0.008 0.000 6.01% 0.754 0.018 0.000 3.45% 0.787 0.009 0.000 6.72% 
African American 1.294 0.008 0.000 9.96% 1.283 0.021 0.000 5.87% 1.295 0.008 0.000 11.05% 
Other Race 0.908 0.009 0.000 6.99% 0.860 0.021 0.000 3.93% 0.918 0.010 0.000 7.84% 
Age 4-6 0.551 0.005 0.000 4.24% N/A 
  
  N/A 
  
  
Age 7-12 0.916 0.005 0.000 7.05% N/A 
  
  0.919 0.005 0.000 7.85% 
Sixth Birthday 8.374 0.175 0.000 64.44% 9.328 0.206 0.000 42.69% N/A 
  
  
Citizen 1.951 0.064 0.000 15.01% 2.054 0.258 0.000 9.40% 1.948 0.066 0.000 16.63% 
High CDPS 0.907 0.005 0.000 6.98% 0.925 0.015 0.000 4.24% 0.908 0.006 0.000 7.75% 
Diabetic 0.865 0.037 0.001 6.66% 0.610 0.140 0.032 2.79% 0.881 0.039 0.004 7.52% 
Asthmatic 0.860 0.008 0.000 6.62% 0.830 0.017 0.000 3.80% 0.867 0.008 0.000 7.40% 
Mental Health 0.965 0.007 0.000 7.42% 1.024 0.022 0.269 4.69% 0.957 0.008 0.000 8.17% 
Teen Mother 0.958 0.150 0.785 7.37% 0.988 0.155 0.939 4.52% N/A 
  
  
Parent over 40 0.785 0.004 0.000 6.04% 0.782 0.016 0.000 3.58% 0.787 0.004 0.000 6.72% 
Mom Primary 1.119 0.006 0.000 8.61% 1.147 0.018 0.000 5.25% 1.119 0.007 0.000 9.55% 
             Number of Spans 315,415 
   
51,276 
   
264,139 
   Number of Exits 198,198 
   
25,040 
   
173,158 
   Avg. Span Length 8.17 
   
10.67 
   
7.68 
   Avg. Exit Prob 7.70% 
   
4.58% 
   
8.54% 
   
             Note: We are also controlling for the child’s public health district of residence as of the first month of their 
enrollment span; linear and quadratic time trends; and spikes in the exit rate during the first three months of each 
span, during the end of each calendar year, and in July 2005, but these coefficients are not reported above. 
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Alternate Specifications 
As mentioned above, the results from Table 5 suggest that in general children with health 
problems are less likely to exit PeachCare than healthy children.  In a separate specification not 
reported in Table 5, we test whether or not children with health problems are differentially 
impacted by premium changes.  First, we combine our four health variables into one indicator 
equal to one if a child is has asthma, diabetes, a mental health condition, or an above average 
CDPS score.  Next, we re-estimate our hazard model on all children in our sample with the 
combined poor health indicator and an interaction between this combined poor health indicator 
and the child’s effective premium.  If the hazard coefficient on this interaction is larger than one, 
that suggests that children with poor health are more likely to exit as a result of a change in 
premiums than healthy children.  The estimated hazard coefficient is .99586, or essentially 1.00.  
This suggests that children in poor health do not respond differently than healthy children to 
premium changes.  In other words, if premiums are set at a certain level our results predict that 
sick children are less likely to exit than healthy children.  If these premiums are then raised by 
$1, we don’t expect to see sick children respond differently than healthy children, so the 
difference in their exit rates should remain.  Marton and Talbert (2010) find similar results when 
analyzing a premium increase in Kentucky. 
 
In Table 5, a child exiting PeachCare by transferring to Medicaid is treated the same as a child 
exiting public health insurance coverage completely.  Of the 198 PeachCare exits in our main 
sample, 24,462 (12 percent) represent transfers to Medicaid and 173,736 (88 percent) represent 
children leaving public coverage completely.  In another separate specification not reported in 
Table 5, we estimate a competing risk model (as in Marton, Ketsche, Zhou, 2010) in order to 
separate the impact of a premium increase on the probability of exiting PeachCare via Medicaid 
from the impact on the probability of leaving public coverage completely.  Our competing risk 
model suggests that the hazard coefficient on the effective premium variable of 1.018 estimated 
from our full sample is the combination of a slightly higher hazard coefficient associated with 
leaving public coverage completely (1.021) and a slightly lower hazard coefficient associated 
with moving to Medicaid (0.989).  Therefore, the competing risk model suggests that a premium 
increase will reduce the probability that a PeachCare enrollee will exit via Medicaid and increase 
the probability that a child will exit to no public health insurance coverage. 
 
Premium Increase Simulation 
We use our model to simulate the effect of increasing premiums by $5, $10, and $15 on the 
enrollment of a cohort of children over a year.  This helps translate the dollar per child per month 
odds generated in the hazard model into a more easily interpretable effect that reflects a range of 
real, or potentially real, premium policy changes. 
 
This simulation quantifies the effect of a premium increase on total enrollment for a given cohort 
of children assuming all other characteristics of the population remain unchanged.  We model 
enrollment for a single calendar year under the baseline risk of disenrollment and then predict 
how disenrollment would change with a $5, $10, and $15 increase in absolute premiums.  Such 
changes in premiums would translate into changes in the ―effective premium‖ based on current 
family sizes and enrollment of between $2.80 and $8.50.  
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Table 6: Simulation Results for Premium Increases 
 
  All children Less than 7 7 or older 
Enrollment loss after one year 61,748 43,004 65,728 
        
Loss based on a premium INCREASE of:       
$5 PMPM (31% increase) 63,762 46,597 67,166 
% 3% 8% 2% 
$10 PMPM (62% increase) 65,780 50,350 68,600 
% 7% 17% 4% 
$15 PMPM (93% increase) 67,795 54,241 70,029 
% 10% 26% 7% 
 
The simulations show more clearly the implications of a premium increase on changes in total 
enrollment in CHIP.  The baseline estimates show the level of attrition in a cohort of 100,000 
children in one year under assumptions that reflect the mean effective premiums and 
demographics for children enrolled between 2003 and 2006.  The baseline probability of exiting 
results in a decline in a single cohort of PeachCare enrollment of over 60 percent of the children 
(61,748) within a single year.  In contrast, if premiums were further increased by $5 per member 
per month, disenrollment would increase to over 63,000 from the original cohort, or an increase 
of about three percent in the disenrollment.  If premiums increased by $15 per member per 
month, disenrollment would go up to over 67,000 children.  That is, over 6,000 additional 
children would disenroll by year’s end.   
 
Discussion 
 
Our simulation results from Table 6 suggest a small but significant response to the premium 
level that is consistent with relatively inelastic demand.  Inelastic demand implies that increasing 
the premium still results in lower enrollments but the percentage decrease in enrollment is 
smaller than the percentage increase in premiums.  Because these findings are similar to our 
previous premium elasticity work in which we did not control for child health status, we now 
hold that our previous results were not biased by our inability to control for child health status. 
    
Estimates of the elasticity of take-up (or percent increase in families buying private coverage 
with the percent decrease in premium) of employer-sponsored coverage from the academic 
literature are also inelastic.  These estimates vary from quite low (-0.02 to -0.10:  Gruber and 
Washington, 2005; Cutler, 2002) to slightly higher estimates for choosing between plans among 
those with coverage (-0.3 to -0.76: Cutler and Reber, 1998; Royalty and Solomon, 1999).  Our 
disenrollment as a function of premiums estimate provides some evidence that the price response 
for children in PeachCare is not inconsistent with the elasticities estimated from the private 
health insurance market.      
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Obviously, the most direct policy implication from this work is that coverage for some low-
income children may be interrupted by premium increases, even after controlling for child health 
status.  Estimates of potential revenue from public insurance premiums should take into account 
the offsetting loss of revenues from disenrollment.  While the state faces a trade off in terms of 
revenue generation versus potential disruptions of coverage, our estimates indicate an inelastic 
response to premiums which means that the decline in enrollment is small compared to the 
increase in premiums charged.  
 
The potential value of introducing an element of personal responsibility into the program via 
premiums must be weighed against the potential financial and health implications associated 
with interruptions of coverage.  These breaks in coverage for children who exit as a result of 
increases in premiums are  important for their access to healthcare, as previous research shows 
that most will become uninsured (GHPC, 2005).  Lack of access, especially to the periodic 
preventive care needed by young children, could have longer-term effects on both child health 
and the state budget.  Given that these children are likely to be uninsured and/or return to public 
insurance when in need of healthcare, policies that lead to increased levels of disenrollment 
should be reviewed for their effects on the costs of care received through all sources of public 
subsidy (such as through the emergency room) in both the short and long run.   
 
It is also important to determine the extent to which the effects of higher premiums apply 
primarily to families in income ranges more likely to have access to offers of private insurance, 
perhaps through an employer.  If families with such access are not sufficiently discouraged by 
higher PeachCare premiums to take-up private coverage, then our low elasticity estimate could 
be an indicator of ―crowd-out‖ of private insurance. 
 
The reauthorization of CHIP under CHIPRA and the more general health care reform embodied 
in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) bring significantly increased attention to performance 
indicators.  Under CHIPRA, bonus payments are available to states when they significantly 
increase their enrollment of the lowest-income uninsured children in Medicaid and adopt 
specified measures to streamline enrollment and retention in both Medicaid and CHIP.    Our 
results imply incomplete take-up for public coverage in the face of premiums, even premiums set 
at a modest level.  This suggests the need for a full financial analysis of the impact of premium 
changes on the state’s overall CHIP budget given the cost tradeoffs involved in enrollment 
fluctuations, policy administration, and federal incentive programs.  
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